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 This autumn the 19th National Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will convene in Beijing, and is intended to be the most important event in the Chinese political system for the next 
five years. This congress will also mark the halfway juncture for Xi Jinping’s three top positions in the party-state as Secretary General of the CCP, Chairman of the Central 
Military Commission, and President of China. Xi has assumed a somewhat unexpected 
role during his first term in power. He is much more visible in domestic and inter-national media than his predecessor ever 
was. In addition, he chairs more committees and more of the issue-focused ‘leading small 
groups’ than has previously been the norm. 
The distribution of the main work portfolios between the President and Premier also seems to have shifted in the direction of Xi Jinping in that he presides over meetings and events that were traditionally the responsi-
bility of the Premier.The Chinese Communist Party has ope rated under some form of collective 
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central collective leadership in the CCP means that the Standing Committee of the 
Politburo makes policy decisions based on 
consensus and compromise. Issues are open for discussion and debate behind closed doors, but when a majority opinion has been reached and decided upon, the party must stand together as one and present a 
unified message to the public. However, the recent changes in Xi’s public appearance and political roles have led to a debate among observers of Chinese politics about whether collective leadership practices now are in the 
midst of radical change.Before we can establish whether collective leadership is declining in importance, we 
need to define its role in Chinese politics. What are the origins of collective leadership in China and how does this leadership 
principle affect decision-making? Although Chinese sources emphasise particularly Chinese characteristics with regard to their current practice of collective leadership, its origins as an ideal of political governance 
can also be traced back to Vladimir Lenin and the Communist Party of The Soviet 
Union. In the Chinese setting, the starting point of the history of Chinese collective decisions has been positioned in the early 
years of Mao Zedong. However, during 
the time of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution (1958–1976) the political practice under Mao went counter to 
the party principles of collective decisions. 
Official party history describes this as a 
grave mistake, and that Deng Xiaoping sub-sequently improved the collective system in order to avoid similar lapses into personal 
rule in the future. This approach was largely maintained with Jiang Zemin as party leader (1989–2002) to be further developed under 
Hu Jintao (2002–2012).
The collecTive leadership sysTemWang Chunxi and Ren Chan, in an article on collective leadership published in China in 2016, divide the political areas affected by this leadership practice into six different 
categories. In their words, the collective leadership is a system consisting of six 
central political ‘mechanisms’. It is useful to go through what these six mechanisms consist of in order to gain an understanding of how broad the collective leadership is 
considered to be in the Communist Party. 
Achieving consensus on a matter in the Standing Committee of the Politburo is just the pinnacle of a larger set of norms of 
collective governance. They include:
1. The collective way of transferring 
power from one leader to the next. The current leader no longer has the right or 
opportunity to pick the next leader. This choice is made based on consensus at the top and approval from the wider party 
leadership.
2. The collective set-up in the party 
organisation. There is currently a particular way of dividing responsibilities 
between collective and individual tasks 
in the CCP organisation.
3. Collective study sessions for and by the 
CCP leadership. As an example, Wang and Ren mention that between 1994 and 2002 there were 12 collective study sessions of issues on law and order, often 
twice a year.
4. Collective gathering of information. The collective leadership principle prescribes 
regularised background research, inspections and consultations before 
the party platform is formalised. For 
example, it takes around one year to draft 
the most important party documents. These documents are the result of a series of meetings involving deliberation with, and reports from, other levels of the 
party as well as among central leaders.
5. Policy decisions. The top authority in the CCP is the Standing Committee of 
the Politburo. This is currently a seven-member body, and it needs a consensus or majority among these seven members 
to reach valid policy decisions.
6. Internal supervision. It is the task of the collective to supervise its own members, and the individual is continuously under 
the watch of the collective leadership.
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Practicing these six areas of collective leader ship has become more and more institutionalised from the time of Mao’s 
death until Xi Jinping took over as Secretary 
General of the Communist Party in 2012. 
However, there seems to have been a bottle-
neck regarding efficiency in reaching policy 
consensus in Hu Jintao’s nine-member Standing Committee, especially in the latter 
of his two five-year terms as party leader. Therefore, after the leadership change of 
2012, there were some modifications to 
central leadership dynamics. The Standing 
Committee was reduced back to seven 
members. Soon afterwards, the new party 
leader quickly became a much more visible 
figure as a representative of the party, and observers started wondering how far the 
reversal of collectiveness might go. Will 
we see another Deng or even Mao figure 
in today’s leader Xi? When the Central Committee meeting communiqué in October 2016 referred to Xi with the older title ‘core’ of the leadership, it seemed that another, 
and perhaps crucial, chip had been hacked 
off collective leadership practices. But is this 
really the case?
The concepT of ‘core leader’What does it mean that Xi Jinping has be-come the ‘leader at the core’ or ‘core leader’ 
of the CCP? Some local party leaders started referring to Xi Jinping as the core of the party in early 2016, perhaps as an organised test to observe political reactions to reviving 
this older term. After a few months’ break the Central Committee plenum meeting in Beijing used the term again in their meeting 
communiqué, effectively making it official. 
Does this mean that Xi will be referred to 
as ‘core’ from now on? It might be too early to tell, but it is still in use eight months into 2017, and its current use in central 
documents is more significant than its initial 
introduction on local levels of the CCP.
However, the meaning of ‘core leader’ is 
different from ‘paramount leader’. ‘Core’ is rather a term emphasising collectiveness over hierarchy in a setting where both are 
present. The concept of ‘core’ has in the past 
been an integral part of collective leadership 
theory, not a contradiction to it. The leader at the core is the individual in the collective who has extra responsibilities, rights and representation but who cannot be named top leader without creating a contradiction in 
terms with the collective leadership concept. 
In this way ‘core’ represents a balancing act.
In addition, Xi is not becoming an 
exception by receiving this title. On the contrary, in search of an exception we 
could rather point to Hu Jintao. Jiang Zemin before him was also referred to as the core 
of the party. Why was there no use of ‘core’ 
between 2002 and 2012? Some sources say 
this is because Hu Jintao did not want the title in order to further the development of 
collective decision-making. Others hint that 
Hu was a weaker leader and never achieved 
becoming ‘core leader’ in spite of trying. Whichever explanation is closer to the truth, 
the use of ‘core’ disappeared from official 
texts for a decade. This means that we are 
indeed observing a kind of reversal taking place in rhetorical practice surrounding collective leadership in addition to Xi’s 
more visible role. However, this reversal in the status of the ‘core’ title is towards the situation in 2002 rather than toward the 
Deng Xiaoping or Mao Zedong eras. We seem 
to be back at the Jiang-era balancing act in political concepts concerning collective 
leadership.This is also evident in the mentioned Central Committee communiqué from late 
2016. The rest of this document explains at length that collective leadership is still the basic operating principle of the CCP, and that no individual in the party can counter the 
collective leadership principle. These points are underlined perhaps even stronger in the latest plenum communiqué than what is normally the case in other recent political 
documents. In this way it weighs up for the simultaneous renewed use of ‘core’ in the 
same document. This reveals an effort to 
keep the balance intact. 
In this way, cautious balancing and mini-mal expression of change remain the practice 
of the Chinese Communist Party. This is in 
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itself an integral part of the continuous con-
sensus-making process while also provid ing a signal that collective leadership is still in 
operation. At the upcoming 19th National Party Congress in the autumn of 2017 the CCP will adjust formulations in the party 
plat form. We need to look to the documents and new personnel changes coming out of 
this next party congress to find out more about where collective leadership in the CCP 
is heading with Xi Jinping at the core.
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